INTRODUCTION
The Battlegroup Concept was initiated in 2004, when the EU was trying to develop its role in the global security environment following divisions over the Iraq war. Building upon the Artemis mission, the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) process, it sought to provide a value-added rapid reaction mechanism for military action, within the member states' limited capabilities, whilst at the same time avoiding duplication with NATO's reaction force. However divergences among the member states regarding CSDP including when, where and how force should be used, threat perceptions and the role of multilateralism, encompassing Atlanticist and Europeanist visions for CSDP, also affect the Battlegroups. The concept therefore acts as a prism through which the challenges facing CSDP can be viewed. This paper will analyse member state attitudes to the Battlegroups through a focus on two neighbouring countries, Germany and Poland. In particular, the article assesses the impact that two different strategic cultures have on the Battlegroup Concept and in turn how this affects the overall development of CSDP. These divergences encompass when force is used, threat perceptions and multilateralism. Additionally there are also divergences between Germany, Poland and the EU level, such as where force is used. The article will highlight the implications these divergences have for the functioning of the Battlegroups and how this one concept highlights the overall problems within CSDP.
Strategic culture will form the analytical foundation of the paper. It is particularly salient as it focuses on when, where and how force is used, which are central issues within the Battlegroup Concept. In particular a country's strategic culture provides its policy-makers with a range of beliefs, attitudes and norms concerning what actions are appropriate within the security and defence field. This also informs the discussion concerning the potential emergence of a European strategic culture which encompasses how far member states' strategic cultures are converging, highlighting that strategic culture can be subject to change.
Indeed, both German and Polish approaches to security and defence issues have incrementally shifted, highlighting that aspects of their strategic cultures have come into conflict. This has placed pressure on both countries to play a more active role. The pressure to be more active, can also be highlighted through constraining and facilitating factors. These encompass international expectations, aspirations that the concept creates and financing. The former underlines the role that the international community expects a country to undertake and is particularly important in the German case due to the centrality of reflexive multilateralism in German strategic culture. Whilst the international community has pressured Germany into taking on a greater role following the end of the Cold War, this has conflicted with the country's restraints on the use of force. Aspirations to play a greater role are meanwhile particularly pertinent in the Polish case. In particular the Poles' emphasis on being involved in decisions affecting their interests has overridden the country's narrower security interests. Despite these pressures, financing acts as a constraint on what Germany and Poland can in reality achieve. Indeed the article will underline that those countries which are the most willing, such as Poland, are restricted militarily.
Whilst this article could be seen as a purely academic exercise considering that the Battlegroups have not been used, it is argued that assessing where, in which circumstances and with which partners the Battlegroups should operate has important implications for the development of the EU as a security and defence actor. Thus does involvement in a concept such as the Battlegroups encourage member states such as Germany and Poland to take up a greater role than they otherwise would? If these issues do not correspond with German or Polish perceptions on the use of force, how will this impact upon their willingness to participate? Through interviews with Polish and German security and defence elites, it is possible to highlight the extent of each country's participation in the Battlegroups and how far their strategic cultures have shifted to take account of the new security situation and their role within it. This includes such issues as deploying force outside of Europe, acting without a UN mandate, activeness regarding the use of force and views on the EU as an independent security actor, which ties in with their approaches towards multilateralism and Atlanticism.
Finally, conclusions can be drawn regarding the development of CSDP, particularly concerning the limits of member states' participation and consequently the restrictions placed on the EU's role in the international environment. In particular the article concludes that a European strategic culture must be development further in order for the EU to become an effective security actor. Indeed, whilst convergence between German and Polish strategic cultures has occurred, this still leads to a lowest common denominator strategic culture which is unable to provide guidance regarding military interventions abroad. This has led in part to the non-deployability of the Battlegroups and consequently has dented the EU's effectiveness as a military actor.
A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE?
Strategic culture can be defined as the beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of force, held by a security community which has had a 'unique historical experience' (Gray 1999, 51-52) . Of particular importance, is the way in which historical experiences and memories are interpreted. As this differs from one country to the next, a strategic culture is distinctive to the society that holds it (Duffield 1998, 23; Gray 1999, 51) . As historical experiences become embedded in society over a period of time, not least due to written records and commemorations, a strategic culture passes from one generation to the next making it highly stable (Longhurst 2004, 19; Wendt 1999, 163) . Nonetheless, strategic culture sets the limits of the possible rather than acting as a tool by which to choose a hierarchy of choices for each set of circumstances. Therefore it shapes rather than determines a country's security and defence policy. As such it fits into Gray's premise that behaviour is an integral part of strategic culture in contrast to Johnston's opposing rationalist view which highlights the breaking of the link between attitudes and behaviour to create a version of strategic culture which is falsifiable (Johnston 1995, 35-36; Gray 1999, 55) .
Whilst continuity is stressed, strategic culture is not static. Change in strategic culture usually occurs in reaction to events in the external security environment, although this does not automatically happen due to the socialisation and thus institutionalisation of strategic culture. The most profound changes usually occur in reaction to war and conflict and lead to the complete replacement of a society's strategic culture as occurred in the case of Germany after the end of the Second World War. This is however extremely rare and instead the advent of new security conditions as seen with the end of the Cold War in 1989 or 9/11 will usually produce more moderate, gradual change (Longhurst 2004, 20) . Indeed, whilst Polish and German strategic cultures have shifted, there is agreement on the main tenets of both countries' security and defence aims across the political spectrum.
To what extent can an organisation such as the EU possess a strategic culture?
Opinion is divided with Cornish and Edwards, Meyer and Reis suggesting that an EU strategic culture is beginning to emerge while Heiselberg, Rynning and Baun argue that there is not enough convergence at the EU level on the use of force to facilitate one (Baun 2005; Cornish and Edwards 2005; Heiselberg 2003; Meyer 2006; Reis 2009; Rynning 2003) .
Studies also differ in relation to whether they look at convergence and divergence between member states in order to ascertain if a European strategic culture is being created (Meyer 2006) or whether they focus on the EU level (Toje 2005; Rogers 2009 ). This article sides with Meyer as CSDP is an intergovernmental area and thus it is the member states who decide whether to create a concept such as the Battlegroups or deploy troops abroad.
However, a European strategic culture will not replace national cultures but will rather provide an additional layer. Whilst some convergence between national strategic cultures will be necessary, they do not have to be identical for a common position to occur.
As Meyer (2006, 7) states 'it should be conceived of primarily as the increasing institutionalisation of those ideas, norms and values that are sufficiently shared at the national level'. Therefore, member states must share common views regarding when (operational scenarios), where (location of EU operations) and how (multilateralism and the rule of law) the EU as an independent security actor uses force.
Nonetheless, once the EU member states have decided upon political documents and military concepts, it is still of relevance to compare a country's views on the use of force to these. In particular, it is one thing for a member state to sign up to a concept and another to enact it. This will also depend on whether a country has the ability (i.e. relevant military capabilities) to carry out the necessary military action, whether they are under pressure to contribute (international expectations) and how far the military action matches their own aspirations. Therefore German and Polish positions on when, where and how force should be used will be compared to the current ideas underlying the Battlegroup Concept. In addition, their military capabilities and the impact of international expectations and their own aspirations will also be covered.
CASE STUDY SELECTION AND GERMAN AND POLISH STRATEGIC

CULTURES
At first sight the choice of Germany and Poland does not seem obvious. Nonetheless, it is argued that these two countries illuminate both the challenges of the Battlegroup Concept and that of the wider CSDP. Whilst the larger member states will shape the development of CSDP, it still requires agreement from a wider number of countries than the two military powers: France and the UK. In the context of an enlarged EU, this is particularly significant considering the differences in threat perception between the 'old' and 'new' member states which could impact upon when, where and how the EU uses force. In this respect a comparison between Germany, as an 'old' member state and Poland as a 'new' member state is illuminating. Although it is important to focus on larger member states as they have more opportunity to obstruct the Battlegroups due to their larger role and political clout, this dimension should also be taken into consideration. Additionally, it is important to concentrate on countries which have been under pressure to do more to participate and to take up leadership roles. This is due to the fact that these types of countries are more likely to have a greater impact on the developing capabilities that CSDP and consequently the Battlegroups have at their disposal, than those countries which are already doing enough and are therefore not increasing their contributions. Evidently Germany and Poland fall into this former category. Indeed, many of the Battlegroups do not encompass either France or the UK. In other words, due to the rotating nature of the Battlegroups, it is essential that all member states have the ability and willingness to deploy. The concept also allows medium sized member states to come forward and take up a leadership role.
In consideration of the above, this article looks at two larger member states which are Germany's strategic culture is historically represented by the concept of 'Stunde Null', which led to a feeling of 'never again' (Longhurst 2004, 46) . This concept led to two further sentiments which came together to form the core of Germany's strategic culture. First was the rejection of nationalism, which led to the country's reflexive multilateralism. Second was the culture of restraint on the use of military force (Duffield 1994, 179) . In relation to the former, reflexive multilateralism relates specifically to the integration of the country into western security structures such as the EEC and NATO and placed an emphasis on working with partners and in coalitions by consensus. Additionally it encompasses Germany's sowohl als auch policy of not choosing between its EU and NATO partners. Connected to this is an emphasis on working within multilateral frameworks and within international law, in addition to demonstrating reliability and predictability in foreign policy.
This key element has however placed pressure on the country's restrictions concerning the use of force. After the end of the Cold War the country's allies asked that Germany 'normalise' its role in foreign affairs rather than continuing to engage in checkbook diplomacy. This has meant that a conflict has occurred between the country's reflexive multilateralism and its culture of restraint on the use of force, which has resulted in a widening of the latter following in particular the massacre at Srebrenica. What has occurred since is an incremental shift in the country's strategic culture towards deploying German forces out of area for humanitarian reasons.
Meanwhile Poland's strategic culture has been formed through its experience of heroic defeat and victim of Realpolitik, as evidenced at Yalta when Poland was deserted by its allies and placed under the Russian sphere of influence (Osica 2004a, 304-305) . Thus at the core of the country's strategic culture is the protection of Poland's independence. This has led to the country's instinctive Atlanticism as only the US through NATO's Article Five could protect the Poles' security, a proclivity to use force, being a reliable ally as well as an emphasis on 'nothing about us without us'. This last point encompasses a central and vocal role in European decision-making. Additionally the Poles are sceptical of multilateral institutions, which relates to the UN rather than the EU and NATO both of which were seen as the country's 'return to Europe'. Essentially the Poles are sceptical about the effective functioning of an organization which includes differing values within the Security Council (i.e. Russia) (Osica 2004b, 14) .
As in the German case, Polish strategic culture has also seen incremental change. In particular, in order to be seen as a reliable ally and to be included in decisions affecting their interests, Polish policy-makers have had to widen their regional approach to security and commit to sending troops further afield, as seen in EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR CHAD/RCA. Additionally, the Poles also see this as a way to increase their influence in CSDP and as a political commitment.
Poland and Germany represent differing views on some of the major issues concerning CSDP. Whilst Germany's culture of restraint conditions the Germans' strict parameters for the deployment of the Bundeswehr, which is reflected in the decision-making process, the Poles have a pro-active view on deploying force. However, the Poles' proAtlanticist orientation shapes its views concerning the tasks that CSDP should undertake, which also impacts on the Battlegroups. This is in slight contrast to Germany's sowohl als auch policy. Finally Germany is a reflexive multilateralist and as such working with partners within the strict parameters of international law is essential. Poland meanwhile is sceptical regarding multilateralism, which impacts upon such issues as the necessity of a UN mandate.
The two countries do however share a more regional view on where force could be used which has the potential to conflict with the Battlegroup Concept as the EU has a global security focus. For Germany, this relates to restrictions on the use of force and for Poland to their emphasis on the country's independence which highlights threats closer to home. Thus, questions have to be asked concerning the likelihood of the Battlegroups acting within the new member states' sphere of interest and how this is impacting upon declared commitments.
INTRODUCING THE EU BATTLEGROUP CONCEPT
The EU Battlegroup Concept was initiated at a joint Anglo-Franco summit at Le Touquet in Battlegroup Concept filled a shortfall but it has also arranged a way in which troops and resources can be used and on call during specific periods. The Artemis Mission was utilised as a template to flesh out how the Battlegroups would work. Artemis involved the deployment of around 1800 primarily French troops, to Bunia in order to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation (Koivula 2005, 16) . Finally the ESS outlines the stance taken by the member states concerning inter alia threat perceptions, multilateralism and increasing capabilities. Thus it represents the political foundations of the Battlegroups as the concept will be based on this broad agreement.
(Insert Table 1 here)
OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS
When should force be used? The EU is divided between those member states who have strict criteria on the use of force such as Germany and others who have a more pro-active approach which includes Poland. Germany's culture of restraint has ensured that their focus is placed on a comprehensive approach to security encompassing primarily civilian aspects. In contrast Poland's pro-active view on the use of force is based on a belief that the Poles should support their allies. However, this stance has to be tempered by the Poles' 'instinctive Atlanticism' (Longhurst and Zaborowski 2003, 1010 (Chappell 2009) . Therefore, the Battlegroups are to be used as an initial entry force, if necessary to be followed by a larger force either from the EU itself or another multilateral body such as the UN or NATO. As
Andersen (2006, 25) emphasises, the Battlegroups 'are driven by the underlying principle, "first force in, first force out" in humanitarian assistance missions and military crisis management tasks'. Alternatively they can be used as a bridging force to allow another organization e.g. the UN to regroup their forces or to refocus the mission.
From the above, the types of missions the Battlegroups will undertake do not represent an insurmountable political obstacle to either Germany or Poland. First, the most likely tasks the Battlegroups will perform will initially not be too high in intensity. As Kerttunen (2005, 36) highlights 'separation of belligerent parties by force is far too demanding'. From a German viewpoint they can only be used up to and including nonpermissive environments, whereby there might be some resistance from small rebel groups. South-East Asia points to the need for remodelling the concept of such groups, so that they will be able to deliver effective international relief in such crisis situations.' (Rotfeld 2005, 16) . It is interesting that Rotfeld highlights remodelling the Battlegroup Concept in order so that they take on softer security tasks, which indicates the country's preference for the EU to concentrate more on the civilian side so that it avoids conflicting with NATO's security role.
A similar view has also been articulated by the chairman of the EU Military Committee,
French General Henri Bentegeat who is reported to have suggested that the Battlegroups should be used primarily for natural disasters (Czech News Agency 2009).
Whilst the views of German and Polish policy-makers highlight a common approach regarding potential missions, the question remains as to whether the Battlegroups will end up carrying out operations at the lower end of the Petersberg Tasks due to member states' restrictions regarding the use of force. Finding a consensus has already impacted upon what missions the EU is prepared to undertake within the CSDP framework. Considering the focus of Germany in particular, is on softer security aspects, the Battlegroups highlight that the same restrictions apply. However the Battlegroups would then be contributing to UN missions, which highlights issues related to operational command (Gowan 2005, 16) . Moreover, the EU could undertake missions independently with a UN mandate. Indeed, it does not necessarily have to be the UN who backs up or initiates the request for the Battlegroups. The EU could arguably work with other organisations such as NATO or respond to crises at the request of a nation state's government. The same applies to the extension or take-over of a mission. Whilst this task has been connected with the UN, it is possible that NATO could fulfil this task too.
WORKING WITH THE UN AND NATO
Despite the differing importance of multilateralism in German and Polish foreign policy, working with the UN is seen by both as being worthwhile. Although German policymakers' ensured that the Battlegroup Concept was re-focused away from being used primarily by the UN, they still see the organisation as central to international security. As the 
THE LOCATION OF BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS
Where should CSDP operations more broadly and the Battlegroups specifically operate? The ESS encompasses a global focus which is also reflected in the report on its implementation.
Whilst there is no kind of operational range for the Battlegroups in the Headline Goal 2010, there is a 6000km from Brussels planning assumption. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Polish led Battlegroup states that the Battlegroup 'will take part in operations anywhere outside the EU with a planning assumption of 6000 km from Brussels or as otherwise defined in relevant EU BG documents' (Memorandum of Understanding 2006, 9).
Therefore 6,000km is not seen as the ultimate limit of the Battlegroups' reach in the long
term.
To what extent do member states' defence interests extend beyond Europe? Whilst there has been convergence between the member states concerning the EU's role in the world, differences still exist regarding security interests and activism in military affairs.
Looking at Poland and Germany, both countries' policy-makers have a more regional focus for their security interests. Polish security fears tend to be focused on Russia, whilst
Germany's decision-makers are still wary when using force 'out of area' and so missions need to have a humanitarian element. Additionally, many of the new member states will form the EU's border for a considerable time and therefore regional security is of utmost importance. This is combined with a continued suspicion over Russian intentions in the region (138 th Bergedorf Round Table 2007 , 27).
Whilst for both German and Polish decision-makers, missions on the European continent are clearly in their country's security interests, this is not so obvious in Africa.
Indeed, Germany's security and defence elites were originally concerned that the Battlegroup Concept would only be used in Africa. At the same time, the value of the concept was understood and they therefore refocused the concept so that it could be used for all crises and conflicts. 5 This reflects German concerns that other member states are using CSDP as a way of sharing their colonial responsibilities both financially and politically. (Menon 2009, 240-241) . This was underlined by the fact that the request came from Guéhenno, the head of the UN peacekeeping department and a French diplomat and circumvented normal procedures, leading to German concerns that this was a French rather than a UN request (Gross 2009, 150 ; Alecu de Flers, Chappell and Müller 2011, 16) . Indeed some policy makers as well as the public find it difficult to understand why the Bundeswehr should go to Africa, which cuts across party lines. 7 This is also a reflection on the Germans' restrictions on the use of force.
Therefore, as Ryjáĉek (2009, 495) states 'the government found itself with two dilemmas:
first between the positions in favour and against; and second between domestic constraints and international commitments'.
Initially the use of a Battlegroup had been suggested by the French. However, as the Germans would be left to pay for the majority of the mission due to the "costs lie where they fall" principle in addition to issues such as it was not a rapid reaction operation and the Battlegroup in any case could not fulfil the mission remit, the Germans declined (Alecu de Flers, Chappell, Müller 2011, 16-17) . Nonetheless, in the end the Germans' effective multilateralism pushed the boundaries of its restraints on the use of force and the country, under pressure from France, became the Framework Nation for the EU mission which was eventually sent. Therefore as Alecu de Flers, Chappell and Müller (2011, 18) Chappell, Müller 2011, 19) . In this respect, Polish policy-makers can have a greater influence on the development of CSDP if they actively participate in it. Second Polish policy-makers wanted to prove the country's predictability in security and defence matters, particular in contrast to its unpredictability in other areas of the EU, which occurred under the Kaczyński leadership. These two aspects have overridden the Poles' regional security approach which is based on the country's threat perceptions.
Evidently, there is a division between member states such as Germany and Poland, who would prefer CSDP to operate primarily in Europe and Eurasia and the broad security interests of the EU as set out in the ESS. Indeed it should be noted that Germany, along with the UK, once again rejected a Battlegroup deployment to the Eastern Congo at the end of 2008. One of the reasons behind this was the reluctance to engage troops in Africa, mirroring German concerns in 2006 as highlighted above (Menon 2009, 236) . Thus such divisions which can be seen within CSDP in general, clearly have implications for the Battlegroups.
FINANCING DEPLOYMENT
Whilst political issues often take centre stage when deciding on a mission, intervening factors must not be forgotten. Financing in particular can act as a constraint to action. In the Battlegroup Concept this relates specifically to getting the Battlegroup to the theatre of operations, primarily through strategic airlift due to the strict deployment timeline. The French, German, British 'food for thought' paper states that 'member states offering BGs will need to ensure that their bid includes appropriate strategic lift assets, pre-identified, earmarked and available to meet the 15-day target' (France, Germany, UK 2004, 3) . In relation to strategic lift, 'up to 200 C130/30 C17 (outsized) aircraft sorties for initial deployment to a central African theatre' would be required (France, Germany, UK 2004, 4) .
The EU as a whole suffers from a lack of strategic airlift, which is essential if the Battlegroups are to be deployed in the time allotted. Poland has acquired six C-130s as part of the financial package for the F-16s, the first of which arrived last year. This will improve There are two problems with these types of initiatives. First is the question as to whether the flying hours and the planes themselves will be available when required for a Battlegroup mission. Second is the cost of actually leasing aircraft. As Menon (2009, 239) states 'the cost to the UK Exchequer of leasing four C-17s from Boeing has been put at $200,000 per aircraft, whilst that of a single Antonov flight to Afghanistan as part of ISAF is around $250,000' (see also Lindstrom 2007, 35; Jacoby and Jones 2008, 337) . The costs put leasing arrangements beyond many member states.
In consideration of the costs involved, will the member states be prepared to participate and/or pay for a mission? Currently missions are funded through 'common costs'
and through the 'costs lie where they fall' principle, which are borne directly by the member states. The former are funded through the Athena mechanism and member states contribute to this depending on their gross national income. Hence Germany, which funds 20.97% of the common costs, is the largest contributor, whilst Poland, which puts in 2.21%, is tenth (EU Council Secretariat 2006, 5) . Another issue concerns Battlegroup transport costs as these were previously considered as common costs (Menon 2009, 239) . Thus for poorer member states such as Poland this made participating in the Battlegroup Concept financially easier as the burden of strategic transport was lessened. 11 The question was therefore whether those countries which pay a higher share of the common costs and are not participating in a Battlegroup mission would be prepared to use the Battlegroups as opposed to ad hoc arrangements. Nonetheless, in relation to the potential use of the Nordic Battlegroup for the Chad mission in 2008, Jacoby and Jones (2008, 332) underline that 'the Swedish political leadership may have quietly signalled that they could not afford a deployment. As the lead nation, and without a common EU budget to tap, the huge costs of deployment to Chad 'lay where they fall', which was to say on Sweden'. If Sweden could not afford to deploy the Nordic Battlegroup under this arrangement it is difficult to see how poor member states such as Poland will be able to deploy under the new rules in which transport costs are no longer seen as common. In this sense the actual conundrum is that those member states that are willing to deploy are in fact financially unable to do so.
DECLARED COMMITMENTS
Considering the divergences among the member states concerning where and when a Battlegroup should be used, how has this impacted upon their declared commitments to the concept? From Table 1 , it appears that the member states are committed to the concept. This is assisted by the fact that Battlegroups can be formed multinationally. Therefore for a country such as Poland becoming an FN for a multinational Battlegroup represents a compromise between two extremes: to form their own Battlegroup or to join another FN.
However as Kawałowski underlines the creation of a national Battlegroup 'will be worth considering in the future as it will follow the transformation process of the Polish military forces, the implementation of conclusions of strategic defence reports, as well as operational experience (Iraq, Afghanistan, DR Congo)' (Kawałowski 2007, 53-54) . 12 Clearly though, Polish transformation is occurring whilst working in conjunction with other countries in the Battlegroup concept in addition to NATO as this enables the Polish armed forces to identify 'capability areas that need to be developed. These include for instance CIS, NBC, ISTAR and strategic lift' (Gągor 2007, 2) . Indeed Polish officials see cooperation between countries as positive in respect to the Battlegroups. 13 Meanwhile, for German policy-makers, the country is holding up the flag of multinationalism, particularly by working with small countries and assisting Poland in its Framework Nation role. Essentially German decision-makers have made sure that those small countries that want to take part can do. Originally they worked on a 2 + 1 principle whereby a Battlegroup would be made up of two large member states and one small one. 14 Evidently this criterion has widened, considering that Germany is taking part in Battlegroups comprising of five countries. This highlights the centrality of multilateralism in German 
CREATING ASPIRATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
Clearly, the Battlegroup Concept has the potential to be a driver for capability development and for making the armed forces of member states more capable of undertaking rapid long-range deployments (Williams 2006, 2) . Thus the Battlegroups create and/or fulfil expectations and ambitions which can override more narrowly conceived security and defence policies. As Jacoby and Jones (2008, 333) underline in the case of Sweden, 'the EU BG concepts gave specific shape and form to an important national ambition'. Additionally the Battlegroups are partly based on permanent structured cooperation, which politically pressurises the member states therefore acting as a catalyst for further cooperation. 15 Whilst participation is voluntary, peer pressure compels member states to want to be included rather than to be left on the sidelines. This raises the question as to how far a country's threat perceptions, views on the use of force and financial considerations act as a constraint on their participation.
For the Poles, the importance of being able to participate in decisions affecting their interests in security matters means that Polish policy-makers are looking to play a key role in CSDP. This has spilt over into the Battlegroup Concept as the Poles' wish to take on a proactive role whilst also improving the country's capabilities. Due to Poland's policy-makers' work towards the country's NRF contribution, becoming a FN for the Polish, German, Latvian, Lithuanian and Slovak Battlegroup did not pose too many problems as the structure, units and procedures are similar, although the Battlegroup Concept 'also stimulates the development and modernisation of Polish armed forces' (Kawałowski 2007, 54 French had subsequently suggested the use of the Battlegroups. However as previously stated, this proposal was rejected by the UK and Germany both of whom were acting as Framework Nations for the two Battlegroups on standby at the time. As Menon (2009, 236) states in the case of Germany, 'opposition to intervention stemmed from a reluctance to send troops to Africa, coupled with growing suspicions that German troops were being used as 'cover' by certain partners to legitimize intervention in their former colonies'. Thus German concerns seem to be focused on where force is used which reflects their restrictions on the use of force and connected to this, the necessity of getting two thirds of the Bundestag to agree to any deployment.
For other countries, such as Poland it is clear that the political willingness does exist as other domestic factors override threat perceptions and where force should be used in an EU context. Indeed, Witney has described Poland as 'a "go to" player in European defencealways ready to contribute, whether to a new operation or a new collaboration (…) its determination to achieve front-rank status in defence is palpable' (Witney 2008, 24 In summary, divisions between europeanists and atlanticists have not impacted upon the concept. This is due to the fact that even strong atlanticists such as the Poles realise that the Battlegroups are qualitatively and quantitatively different from the NRF and that the EU should be able to play an independent although complementary role to NATO, focusing on civil-military aspects, which the Germans also concur with due to their restrictions on the use of force. This highlights that there is an increasing convergence between the member states concerning the fact that the EU should be able to play an independent role, within the context of international law, using the full range of capabilities up to and including military force.
Meanwhile the conflict between the Germans' culture of restraint and its effective multilateralism has meant that the country has widened the boundaries concerning when force can be used. Finally, both countries are restricted financially and thus compatibility between EU and NATO standards is essential.
However the divergences which remain should not be underplayed. Member states' threat perceptions which impact upon where force should be used combined with the financial cost of deploying the Battlegroups affects the effectiveness of the Battlegroup Concept. Although the concept allows a country such as Germany to back up their political leadership role with concrete military commitment whilst at the same time demonstrating the country's multilateral credentials, the willingness to deploy has been missing. In other words, whilst international expectations have placed pressure on the Germans' restrictions on the use of force, due to the centrality of multilateralism in the country's strategic culture, this has only caused an incremental shift concerning when and where Germany uses force. Therefore, whilst German policy-makers will take their turn to deploy the Bundeswehr in CSDP operations in Africa, this has not resulted in increasing enthusiasm to send troops there. It is this African connection which has resulted in the Germans' reluctance to deploy the Battlegroups.
What is interesting, however, is that the Poles' similar view concerning where force is used, which is based on the country's regional threat perceptions, has not restricted the country's activism further afield. Thus, what might have appeared to be a similarity between German and Polish strategic cultures has turned out not to be the case. This is due to the relative strength in the Germans' restrictions on the use of force in comparison to the relative weakness of Poland's regional view when it comes into conflict with other aspects of its strategic culture. In particular this concerns 'nothing about us without us' in which Poland should be involved in decisions affecting the country's interests and the importance the Poles' place on being a reliable ally. This has led to Polish policy-makers increasing willingness to participate in CSDP and the desire to hold a leadership role. In this respect the Battlegroups have enabled this to take place in addition to acting as a catalyst for military development.
Evidently, there has been some convergence between German and Polish strategic cultures. This encompasses the Germans' increased activism in using force out of area and the broadening of Polish security interests combined with an agreement that the EU should be an independent security actor, particularly in the civil-military field, as long as it does not duplicate NATO. More specifically to the Battlegroup Concept, the atlanticist-europeanist dimension does not come into play due to the rapid reaction nature of the Battlegroups.
However this does not result in a fully fledged strategic culture which would offer a framework concerning the EU's use of military force and thus provide a foundation for the use of the Battlegroups. Therefore whether a Battlegroup is deployed or not will depend on whether it is in each participating member states' interest to do so. In this respect whilst the Battlegroups were created to provide additional usable rapid reaction capabilities and to avoid the need for ad hoc force generation processes, they have not overcome the political willingness hurdles. Consequently, the continued failure of the EU's member states to agree on precisely when, where and how the EU uses force could not only spell the end of the Battlegroup Concept but could also undermine the EU's international reputation as a security provider.
